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CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES  
IN OIL AND GAS TITLE EXAMINATION 
 
TIMOTHY C. DOWD∗ 
In examining a section of land, a title examiner will undoubtedly 
encounter title issues. Typically, the issues are not unique or they can be 
resolved through a number of standard tools for resolving title defects. 
However, sometimes unique issues do arise. Until the courts (or less likely, 
the legislature) resolve the unique issues, a title examiner has to identify 
and make a judgment on the issue, subject to a title requirement.  
This paper deals with some unique and, in some circumstances, 
unanswered questions.  
I. Wellbore Assignments. 
Assignments of oil and gas leases that reference a well continue to give 
title examiners concerns as to whether the assignment is of the assignor’s 
interest in the leases (on a tract basis), or whether the assignment is limited 
to the wellbore of a described well.  
A. Principles of Contract Interpretation. 
Conveyances of interests in oil and gas leases are subject to the same 
general rules of interpretation as contracts.1 The primary goal in construing 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Timothy C. Dowd is an attorney with Elias, Books, Brown & Nelson, in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. The Author expresses his appreciation to Frank Hinton for much of the 
material on wellbore assignments. 
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an assignment or any conveyance is to determine the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the conveyance.2 Often referred to as the “four corners” 
doctrine, a court will look at the conveyance in its entirety,3 with effect 
given to every part of the conveyance.4 Generally, if an instrument is clear 
and unambiguous on its face, then extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to 
determine the intent of the parties.5 Whether a contract or a conveyance is 
ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide.6  
There are two basic approaches to contract interpretation. They are often 
referred to as the traditional rule and the modern rule. Under the traditional 
rule, contract interpretation is treated as a question of law for the court to 
decide based on the four corners of the instrument by applying rules of 
construction. Only after a court determines that the intent of the parties 
cannot be determined from the document itself (i.e., that it is ambiguous) 
will a court allow extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.7  
According to the modern rule, as contract interpretation seeks to 
determine what the parties actually intended, the fact that the parties dispute 
intent makes the conveyance ambiguous.8 A conveyance is ambiguous if it 
is “reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions”9 or contains 
“an intrinsic uncertainty.”10 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1984); Comet Energy Services, 
LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures LLC, 185 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Wyo. 2008) (citing 
Hickman v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256, 258 (Wyo. 2003)).  
 2. 1 JOYCE PALOMAR & ROBERT WILCOX, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, § 
202 (3d. ed. 2003). 
 3. Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d. 1270, 1272 (Okla. 1990).  
 4. 1 JOYCE PALOMAR & ROBERT WILCOX, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, § 
202 (3d. ed. 2003); Petro Pro Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. 
App. 2007); N.D. Cent. Code § 9-07-06.  
 5. Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App. 2007). 
But see Chisos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C., 258 P.3d 1107, 1110 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011)(“A 
court may hear evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in 
order to determine if it is unclear.”).  
 6. Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1984); Chisos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, 
L.L.C., 258 P.3d 1107, 1110 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK 
Exploration, L.P., 250 P.3d 328, 330 (Okla. 2011).  
 7. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When is Contract Interpretation 
a Legal Question and When is it a Fact Question?, 5 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 81, 85-86 (2010).  
 8. Id. 
 9. Chisos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C., 258 P.3d 1107, 1110 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) 
(quoting Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (N.M. 1993)). 
 10. Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d. 1270, 1273 (Okla. 1990). 
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In specifically eschewing the four corners rule, New Mexico allows 
extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether a conveyance is 
ambiguous, even though it treats the question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous as a question of law.11 It is also a rule of construction that a 
conveyance will be construed most strongly against the grantor.12 
In theory, a title examiner would apply the same rules of contract 
interpretation that a court would, especially in a situation where there is no 
extrinsic evidence of intent of the parties. In practice, a title attorney would 
consider outside factors in construing an instrument regardless of whether 
the instrument seems unambiguous. Frequently, two parties will argue that 
an instrument unambiguously supports each party’s claim, only to have a 
court decide that the instrument is ambiguous.13 Thus, it is difficult for a 
title examiner to determine what a court would decide is ambiguous. 
Further, a title examiner may be advised that a client claims a certain 
interest as a result of a conveyance. Whether or not the conveyance is 
ambiguous, the title examiner will likely credit his or her client with the 
interest claimed, subject to a title requirement to obtain some sort of 
stipulation or other curative. Thus, the cautious approach for a title 
examiner is to err on the side of finding ambiguity, consider all available 
evidence as to the intent of the parties, and draft an appropriate 
requirement.  
Given that construing wellbore assignments is so heavily fact-based, and 
that courts have interpreted cases in some surprising ways, it is instructive 
to look at some cases in further detail. 
B. Case Law. 
1. Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc.  
Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc.14 is probably the seminal case 
construing a wellbore-only assignment. The King “F” No. 2 Well was 
completed on a tract that was later pooled to create a 704-acre gas unit 
producing from the Cleveland Formation between 6,500 and 6,600 feet, but 
also including the Brown Dolomite Formation between 3,400 and 3,600 
                                                                                                                 
 11. C. R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (N.M. 1991). 
 12. Key Production Company, Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc., 2013 WL 1286672 (Tex. 
App. 2013) (mem.) (citing Commerce Trust C. v. Lyon, 284 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Fort Worth 1955)).  
 13. See, e.g. Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P., 250 P.3d 328, 330 (Okla. 
2011). 
 14. 279 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App. 2007).  
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feet. KCS Medallion Resources (“KCS”) and MB Operating Co., Inc. 
(“MB”) were the owners of this unit. In November 1998, KCS and MB 
conveyed to L & R Energy (“L & R”):  
All of Seller’s right, title and interest in and to the oil and gas 
leases described in Exhibit “A” attached hereto and made a part 
hereof (“Subject Leases”) insofar and only insofar as said leases 
cover rights in the wellbore of the King “F” No. 2 Well.15 
Beginning in May 2003, Upland Resources (“Upland”), pursuant to a 
farmout agreement with KCS, drilled three wells in the Brown Dolomite 
Formation: the Skeeterbee No. 1 and Skeeterbee No. 2 Wells, both 
horizontal wells, and the Skeeterbee No. 3, a vertical well.  
In April 2004, L & R assigned its interest in the King “F” No. 2 Well to 
Petro Pro, Ltd. (“Petro Pro”).16 Upon inquiry, Petro Pro determined that 
KCS and Upland were treating the interest of Petro Pro as a wellbore-only 
interest in the King “F” No. 2 Well.17 
In September 2004, Petro Pro filed suit seeking to quiet title to the entire 
704-acre pooled unit, from the surface to a depth of 6,800 feet.18 Several 
royalty owners intervened, seeking damages for alleged breach of implied 
covenants and for tortious interference with existing contracts.19 The 
royalty owners argued that Petro Pro’s lawsuit and claims of ownership 
prevented Upland from fully developing the lease from drainage from 
adjacent wells.20  
In cross motions for summary judgment, Upland contended that Petro 
Pro’s interest was limited to production and enhancement of production 
from the Cleveland Formation from the confines of the King “F” No. 2 
Well.21 The royalty owners contended that Petro Pro “had the right to 
produce from any formation subject to governmental regulations” limiting 
Petro Pro’s horizontal rights to forty acres surrounding the King “F” No. 2 
wellbore.22 Petro Pro contended “they were the exclusive owners of any 
portion of the leasehold estate that could reasonably be reached and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 746. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 746-47. 
 19. Id. at 747. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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produced through the King “F” No. 2 wellbore.”23 At trial, the court found 
the assignment unambiguous and granted Upland’s motion for summary 
judgment.24 
The court of appeals found that the judgment entered by the trial court 
failed to resolve the rights conveyed by the assignment.25 The court of 
appeals construed the limitation to “rights in the wellbore” as limiting the 
assignment to production from the wellbore of the King “F” No. 2 Well at 
the depth it existed at the time of the conveyance.26 This meant that Petro 
Pro’s rights included the right to produce from shallower formations, 
including the Brown Dolomite, but not the right to extend the wellbore 
vertically or horizontally, and not the right to share in production from any 
other well that may be drilled on the lease.  
Important points in this case are that the court relies on Texas’ 
ownership-in-place theory to support its finding that the assignment was 
unambiguously limited to the gas that may be produced from the wellbore 
of the King “F” No. 2 Well. Thus, the court effectively gave some guidance 
on how to interpret an assignment limited to a wellbore absent greater 
definition. The only geographical area conveyed and owned by Petro Pro 
was that required to operate and produce the King “F” No. 2 Well, and the 
depths conveyed to Petro Pro are the depths (both horizontally and 
vertically) penetrated by the existing wellbore. Further, Petro Pro had the 
right to use the wellbore to produce from any uphole formations.  
2. Key Production Company, Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc.  
Key Production Company, Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc.27 follows Petro 
Pro in finding that the language “insofar and only insofar as” described is a 
limitation on the grant but neither reserves nor conveys any interest.28  
In Key Production Company, Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc. the Texas 
Court of Appeals construed a purchase and sale agreement, an assignment, 
and an amendment of the assignment, a joint operating agreement, and a 
declaration of unit in order to determine the intent of the parties.29 Exxon 
was an owner of an interest in the Pearline Perkins, et al., Smackover Gas 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 747-48. 
 26. Id. at 748-53. 
 27. 2013 WL 1286672 (Tex. App.) (mem.).  
 28. Id. at *6. 
 29. Id.  
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Unit, when it conveyed the same to Gasoven, Key’s predecessor in title.30 
The Assignment describes three leases comprising 359.5 acres, and 
specifically reserves the “deep rights,” being depths below 11,680.31 An 
amendment was subsequently executed in which Exxon further reserved the 
Henry Williams, et al., Pettit Gas Unit, which was located at a depth 
between 6,898 feet and 6,900 feet.32 
Exxon subsequently created the Henry Williams Cotton Valley Gas Unit, 
which covered depths between 10,142 feet and 10,340 feet, and was 
covered by the same leases as the Pearline Perkins, et al., Smackover Gas 
Unit.33 Around the same time, the Pearline Perkins Well stopped producing 
and was reworked to produce from the Cotton Valley Gas Unit and, upon 
completion, was renamed the Henry Williams No. 2 Well.34 Exxon 
conveyed its interest to Quality Operating, and Gasoven conveyed its 
interest to Key, and a dispute arose as to ownership of the gas being 
produced from the Henry Williams No. 2 Well.35 Key claimed all interest in 
all three leases, except for those specifically reserved in the assignment and 
amendment (depths below 11,680, and the Pettit Gas Unit from a depth 
between 6,898 feet and 6,900 feet).36 The trial court found the Assignment 
was ambiguous, and that Key’s predecessor had only acquired the leases in 
the Pearline Perkins, et al., Smackover Gas Unit and only in the Smackover 
formation from a depth of 10,980 feet to 11,680 feet.37 The grant in the 
assignment included: 
All leases or wellbores or contract rights INSOFAR AND 
ONLY INSOFAR AS set out in Exhibit A being attached to this 
Assignment and Bill of Sale and made a part hereof for all 
purposes, INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR AS these leases or 
wellbores or contract rights are contained in the units described 
and set out in the particular Exhibit A, and INSOFAR AND 
ONLY INSOFAR AS these leases or wellbores or contract rights 
are subject to the contracts described in Paragraph 2 below or in 
the particular Exhibit. Assignor excepts from this Assignment 
and reserves unto itself all other right, title, and interest, 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at *1. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at *2.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id.  
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including but not limited to any reservation by Assignor of any 
kind of interest (such as overriding royalty, depths, formations, 
contractual rights, etc.) from any conveyance or agreement, 
whether recorded or not, executed or effective prior to the 
execution of this Assignment, as specified herein.38 
The Exhibit “A” contained a page titled “Pearline Perkins, et al., 
Smackover Gas Unit” that described the three leases being conveyed.39 
Important to the court’s analysis was the fact that the Pearline Perkins, et 
al., Smackover Gas Unit had been created by a Designation of Unit that had 
been filed of record in the deed records of Freestone County.40 The 
Designation of Unit described the Smackover Gas Unit as including the 
Smackover formation at a subsurface depth of between 10,980 feet and 
11,680 feet.41 The assignment referred to the recorded Designation of 
Unit.42 
Key argued that reading the assignment as a whole and interpreting the 
assignment as conveying only rights in the Smackover formation would 
negate specific reservations to the deep rights in the assignment and the 
Pettit formation in the amendment.43 Key further argued that the description 
of the unit and the limitation to the leases “contained in the unit” was 
intended to be a limitation of the geographic surface area and not a 
limitation of the depth.44 
The court sided with Quality, finding that the limitation “INSOFAR 
AND ONLY INSOFAR AS these leases or wellbores or contract rights are 
contained in the units described,”45 taken together with the definition of the 
Pearline Perkins, et al., Smackover Gas Unit as found in the recorded 
designation of unit, unambiguously limited the assignment to the 
Smackover formation.46  
It should be noted that the court of appeals held the assignment 
unambiguous.47 Thus, the court was not looking at extrinsic evidence of 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at *4. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at *3. 
 46. Id. at *5.  
 47. Id. at *6 (stating that it was erroneous of the trial court to determine that the 
assignment and amendment was ambiguous).  
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intent when it factored in the unrecorded agreements referred to in the 
assignment, including the amendment, the joint operating agreement, the 
purchase and sale agreement, and the recorded designation of unit. 
3. Comet Energy Services, LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, 
LLC. 
Comet Energy Services, LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC 
is a case that came before the Wyoming Supreme Court twice. In Comet I,48 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming was asked to interpret an assignment of a 
federal oil and gas lease. Powder River claimed the entire 760-acre federal 
lease based on a 1998 assignment of:  
1. The oil and gas well(s) described on Exhibit “A” attached 
hereto (“Wells”), together with all equipment and machinery 
associated therewith; 
2. The leasehold estate created by the lease(s) upon which the 
Wells are located and/or pooled/unitized therewith (“Leases”) 
and all licenses, permits and other agreements directly associated 
with the Wells and/or Leases; 
The Exhibit “A” described, in table form, the State and County, Location 
(4-53N-75W), Well/Unit Name (the Federal 44-4) and the Field. The 
Exhibit “A” header stated:  
This Exhibit “A” contains the description of the wells/units with 
such description intended to incorporate all of 
Seller’s/Assignor’s interest in such wells/units and is not 
intended to be limited to Assignor’s/Seller’s interest in the 
geographic boundaries of the specific spaced/drillsite unit 
description therein.49  
The trial court found that the assignment unambiguously granted Powder 
River the entire 760-acre lease upon which the well sat.50 On appeal, the 
parties main dispute involved the meaning of the term “leasehold estate.51” 
Powder River argued that leasehold estate referred to the entire lease, and 
Comet arued that absent a legal description of the underlying lease, 
“leasehold estate” referred to the 40-acre unit on which the Federal 44-4 
                                                                                                                 
 48. 185 P.3d 1259 (Wyo. 2008). 
 49. Id. at 1263. 
 50. Id. at 1261. 
 51. Id.  
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well was situated.52 The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that it was 
impossible to determine the intent of the parties from the four corners of the 
assignment, specifically with regard to the term “leasehold estate” which 
the court found to be ambiguous, and therefore remanded the case to the 
trial court.53 
On remand, the trial court admitted testimony from the land manager at 
Forcenergy (Powder River’s Assignor) who testified that it was 
Forcenergy’s intent at the time of the conveyance to convey all interest in 
the lease associated with the Federal 44-4 Well.54 The land manager further 
testified that the lease itself had not been described because Forcenergy 
obtained the interest through a series of mergers and did not have records of 
the lease itself.55 Further, spending the money to do the title work would 
not add any value for Forcenergy at the time of the sale. The trial court 
again found in favor of Powder River, and Comet appealed, arguing that the 
testimony of the land manager was inadmissible evidence of the subjective 
intent of the parties.56 
In Comet II,57 the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that a party’s 
subjective intent is not relevant or admissible and that Wyoming uses an 
objective approach to contract interpretation.58 Upon determining that a 
contract or one or more of the terms of a contract are ambiguous, Wyoming 
allows objective evidence of the circumstances surrounding the formation 
of the contract, but does not allow evidence of the subjective intent of the 
parties.59 The objective approach allows extrinsic evidence of the 
relationship of the parties, subject matter of the contract, and the parties’ 
purpose in making the contract.60 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court, holding that the testimony of the land manager “explaining 
Forcenergy’s reason for offering the twenty-six assignments at the 1998 
auction, the process by which the assignments were drafted and why the 
property descriptions were limited to well descriptions, rather than well and 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 1262. 
 53. Id. at 1263. 
 54. 2009 WL 6046871 (Wyo.Dist.) (Trial Order). 
 55. 2009 WL 6046871 (Wyo.Dist.) (Trial Order). 
 56. 2009 WL 6046871 (Wyo.Dist.) (Trial Order). 
 57. 239 P.3d 382 (Wyo. 2010).  
 58. Id. at 387. 
 59. Id. (citing Omohundro v. Sullivan, 202 P.3d 1077, 1084 (Wyo. 2009)). 
 60. Id. (citing Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., L.L.C., 158 P.3d 685, 
688 (Wyo. 2007)).  
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lease descriptions, was the sort of evidence this Court contemplated when 
we remanded the case for resolution of the term ‘leasehold estate.’”61 
Comet II does not exactly address a wellbore-only assignment, as it is at 
least clear that the assignment intended to convey the entire unit on which 
the well was producing (40 acres) However, Comet is a cautionary tale to 
title examiners that even where language appears inclusive, a court might 
find an ambiguity where the assignment describes only the well and not the 
lease, or describes less than the entire tract covered by the lease.  
If there is anything to be gathered from the cases discussed thus far, it is 
that courts appear to be willing to aggressively interpret limitations on 
grants. While paying lip service to the rule of construction that a deed is to 
be most strongly construed against the grantor, it appears that courts are 
frequently willing to find in favor of grantors by interpreting limitations 
broadly and language of grant narrowly. Perhaps there is an unspoken 
policy at work here. It is often an assignee of the remaining interest who 
claims that a prior assignment was wellbore-only, or limited to specific 
depths, or limited to particular geographic tract that is less than the entire 
lease. It is these subsequent assignees who are attempting to develop new 
depths or new acreage, and frequently the assignees of the limited interests 
who are simply producing existing wells. This sort of policy would tend to 
encourage development by those who take a risk on new depths, or new 
horizontal drilling.  
4. Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P. 
In Plano Petroleum, v. GHK Exploration, L.P.,62 Plano claimed the 320-
acre Newell lease as a result of an assignment of:  
All right, title and interest in and to that certain wellbore, all 
leasehold, limited in depth from the surface of the earth to the 
base of the Tonkawa Formation, and all surface and subsurface 
equipment and materials thereon and therein, more particularly 
described as the Claude E. Newell # 1 well. Said leases and well 
located in the northwest quarter of Section 23-17N-25W, Roger 
Mills County, Oklahoma, which wellbore, leases and associated 
equipment and materials so specified are hereinafter referred to 
as “SAID WELL.”63 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at 390. 
 62. 250 P.3d 328 (Okla. 2011). 
 63. Id. at 330. 
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GHK, the successor to the Assignor in that assignment, claimed all right in 
the Newell Lease except for production of the Claude E. Newell No. 1 
Well.64 Plano filed suit seeking to quiet title to the entire 320-acre lease.65 
The trial court found that the assignment unambiguously conveyed the 
entire 320-acre lease to Plano’s predecessor.66 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court found that there was a patent ambiguity in the use of the phrase “all 
leasehold” without a legal description of the lease itself.67 The court 
issued/found five possible interpretations of the assignment, including: 
(1) the instrument was a wellbore only assignment of the Newell 
# 1 well, as GHK argued, and the “all leasehold” language refers 
to leasehold rights insofar as the Newell # 1 well and production 
therefrom is concerned; (2) it assigned the entire 320 acre 
Newell Lease, as Plano argued and the lower courts held; (3) it 
assigned a leasehold of 80 acres in the quarter section which 
contains the Newell # 1 well; (4) it assigned a leasehold of 80 
acres in the quarter section which contains the Newell # 1 well 
limited in depth to the base of the Tonkawa Formation; or (5) it 
assigned the entire Newell Lease limited in depth to the base of 
the Tonkawa Formation.68  
The case was remanded for the trial court to consideration of extrinsic 
evidence of the intent of the parties.69  
5. Chisos, Ltd. v. JKM Energy, L.L.C. 
Chisos, Ltd. v. JMK Energy, LLC70 is a dispute between an Assignor 
(Chisos) and an Assignee (JKM), with Chisos claiming it intended to assign 
a wellbore-only interest in the Stetson Well, and JKM claiming it intended 
to purchase the entire leasehold interest of Chisos in the west half of 
Section 2, which unbeknownst to JKM, included a second well, the HL2.71 
Upon learning that the HL2 well had stopped producing, Chisos sent a crew 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 329. 
 65. Id. at 330.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 331.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. 258 P.3d 1107 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). 
 71. Id. at 1109.  
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out to frac the well, and was informed by JKM’s president that they were 
trespassing.72 Chisos filed suit, and the trial court found in favor of JKM.73  
Although New Mexico courts follow the rule that “[t]he existence of 
ambiguity is an issue of law that we review de novo,”74 it also allows 
extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract formation 
in order to determine if the deed is ambiguous.75 The court quotes, 
“[w]ithout a full examination of the circumstances surrounding the making 
of the agreement, ambiguity or lack thereof cannot properly be 
discerned.”76 Interestingly, The Court of Appeals barely mentioned the 
language of the assignment and focused heavily on the circumstances 
surrounding the assignment. In determining that the assignment was 
ambiguous, the court relied heavily on the testimony of expert witnesses 
finding the assignment ambiguous.77 
Upon determining that a contract is ambiguous, New Mexico applies the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981): 
Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise 
or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance 
with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the 
agreement was made 
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning 
attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning 
attached by the first party; or  
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different 
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to 
know the meaning attached by the first party.78 
In Chisos, the court found that Chisos, who claimed the assignment was 
a wellbore only assignment, knew or had reason to know that the JKM did 
not know or have reason to know that Chisos intended the assignment to be 
wellbore-only.79  
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 1110. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. (quoting Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (N.M. 1993)). 
 75. Id. (quoting C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (N.M. 
1991)). 
 76. Id. (quoting Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (1993)). 
 77. See id. at 1111. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1114. 
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The application of the Restatement to wellbore assignments is one 
approach that may not bring certainty to litigants, but could lead to 
resolution of more of these cases at the trial level. It is unlikely that 
ambiguous wellbore assignments will stop being litigated anytime soon. 
The Restatement approach punishes the side that attempts to take advantage 
of ambiguity at the drafting stage, thus encouraging better drafting to start 
with. North Dakota has a similar statutory rule: If the terms of a promise in 
any respect are ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense 
in which the promisor believed at the time of making it that the promisee 
understood it.80 
C. Drafting considerations. 
As there are no widely used or standardized forms for wellbore 
assignments, as a general approach, the drafter should expressly address as 
many points of potential conflict as possible. As limitations in an 
assignment are considered neither grants nor reservations,81 it is in the 
interest of the parties to expressly convey or reserve any interest owned by 
the assignor in order to avoid ambiguity.82 
1. Legal description  
Careful attention should be given to the difference in the description of 
the location of the well and the description of the premises conveyed. A 
true wellbore-only assignment should clearly state that the legal description 
is included for location purposes only, and that it is the intent of the 
assignor to reserve all interest in the lease(s) covering any lands described. 
It is not advised that a drafter omit a legal description entirely. In a state 
that employs tract indices, the absence of a legal description does not 
provide notice to third parties of the interest of the assignee, as the 
assignment will not appear in the chain of title.83  
2. Description of the Leases. 
A wellbore-only assignment may purport to convey the leases or 
leasehold interest insofar and only insofar as it relates to the borehole and 
production from the borehole. In the alternative, a wellbore-only 
                                                                                                                 
 80. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-07-14. 
 81. Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 82. Kurt M. Petersen, Wellbores: Shedding Light on a Transactional Black Hole, 48 
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 13-30 (2002). 
 83. Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P., 250 P.3d 328, 331-32 (Okla. 
2011). 
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assignment may not describe or purport to convey any interest whatsoever 
in the leases or leasehold interest.84 For title purposes, if the grant is 
effectively limited to production from specific tracts, depths, and boreholes, 
including a description of the underlying leases should not affect the 
interest conveyed. If the assignment is to be the narrowest of wellbore 
assignments, the assignment should clearly recite that any leases described 
are for information purposes only, and that assignor reserves all interest in 
the leases except as required to operate and produce from the wellbore 
assigned. Further, the object of the granting language should be the 
wellbore described, and not the leases or leasehold described.  
The terms “leasehold estate” and “leasehold” with no accompanying 
legal description have been held to render an assignment ambiguous.85 The 
North Dakota Supreme Court has said that the term “working interest” is 
generally synonymous with the term “leasehold interest”, and has held that 
a conveyance of “working interest,” when combined with a description of 
the underlying lease, unambiguously conveys the underlying leases.”86  
3. Rights in a drilling and spacing unit or in a voluntary unit. 
 The assignment should clearly state the interest of the assignor and 
assignee in any pooled unit or drilling or spacing unit. In the narrowest 
wellbore-only assignment, the assignor should reserve the right to drill new 
wells or replacement wells on the same lease tract or unit. Alternatively, the 
assignment should specifically grant these rights to the assignee if it is the 
intent to convey the entire lease or the entire drilling and spacing unit. The 
Assignment should clearly set forth the rights of the parties if new drilling 
and spacing units are formed, or if existing spacing units are respaced, 
despaced, or increased density wells are authorized.87 In Texas, the 
assignment should include acreage necessary to ensure compliance with 
applicable Railroad Commission Rules.88 There is evidence that the term 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Lawrence P. Terrell, Limited Assignments—Who Gets What?, 35 Rocky Mt. Min. L. 
Inst. 17-6 (1989). 
 85. Comet Energy Services, LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC, 185 P.3d 
1259, 1264 (Wyo. 2008); Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P., 250 P.3d 328, 
331 (Okla. 2011). 
 86. Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D. 1984).  
 87. Lawrence P. Terrell, Limited Assignments—Who Gets What?, 35 Rocky Mt. Min. L. 
Inst. 17-7 (1989). 
 88. George A. Snell and Ana Maria Marsland-Griffith, Legal Descriptions—A Little 
Background and a Few New Issues, State Bar of Texas, Oil, Gas and Energy Resource Law 
Section, Section Report, 28 (2011). 
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“wellbore rights” in Oklahoma is considered ambiguous if the well is 
drilled on a drilling and spacing unit.89 
4. Depths. 
In the context of horizontal wells in particular, it is important to 
distinguish between measured depth and vertical depth. Measured depth can 
be determined from the length of the drillpipe and includes the entire length 
of the lateral, while vertical depth is the perpendicular depth from the 
surface to a certain point beneath the surface. If the wellbore is intended to 
include only certain formations, it is a good idea to identify those 
formations with reference to both footage and formation in the actual logs 
of the wellbore assigned or a control well (i.e. limited to the stratigraphic 
equivalent of the top/bottom of a specific formation as found in a specific 
well).90 While Texas has found that a wellbore-only assignment 
unambiguously conveys the rights to uphole formations but not the right to 
extend the lateral vertically or horizontally, other states may find a 
wellbore-only assignment ambiguous as to these rights.91 As such, the 
assignment should specifically address whether the assignee has the right to 
recomplete the well in a different formation (uphole or downhole), as well 
as whether the Assignee has the right to sidetrack, extend the lateral 
vertically, or extend the lateral horizontally. 
5. Tangible Personal Property. 
As an assignment of a wellbore would typically involve personal 
property, including fixtures and equipment, such fixtures and equipment 
should be described with as much specificity as possible. If there is more 
than one well within the area of the well being conveyed, the fixtures and 
equipment should be described with enough specificity to determine which 
equipment is being reserved, and which is being conveyed.92  
6. Intangible personal property and references to other contracts. 
It should be noted that a court will construe an assignment along with 
other contracts or unrecorded agreements to which the assignment refers or 
is explicitly made subject. Thus, the drafter should harmonize any potential 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Cox v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.,152 P.3d 274 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006). 
 90. Lawrence P. Terrell, Limited Assignments—Who Gets What?, 35 Rocky Mt. Min. L. 
Inst. 17-10 (1989). 
 91. Petro Pro, Ltd. v. Upland Resources, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App. 2007). 
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inconsistencies between the assignment and contracts related to the 
assignment. For example, if a wellbore assignment is pursuant to and 
subject to a purchase and sale agreement, the drafter should make every 
attempt to harmonize the two and specify which agreement controls in the 
event of a conflict of any of the terms. As noted above in the discussion of 
Key Production Company, Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc., the court used a 
definition of the Smackover Unit found in a recorded designation of unit. 
As the assignment referenced the designation of unit, the court was free to 
interpret the assignment in the light of the designation of unit without 
finding the assignment ambiguous and admitting extrinsic evidence.93 The 
drafter should be aware of any terms in the assignment which may be 
defined by reference to another agreement and, if necessary, expressly 
disclaim the use of terms from an outside agreement to define terms in the 
assignment.  
As a practical matter, even if the assignment does not refer to or is not 
expressly subject to outside agreements, the parties should anticipate the 
possibility that a court would hold the assignment ambiguous, in which case 
the court would consider the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and 
drafting of the assignment.94  
7. Warranties. 
As the Uniform Commercial Code implies certain warranties with regard 
to the personal property conveyed, special care should be taken to expressly 
disclaim any express warranties and any implied warranties of 
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Further, the assignment 
should address whether and to what extent the assignor warrants title to the 
real property. Either the assignor should expressly warrant title to the 
property, warrant title to the property by or through the assignor but not 
otherwise (a “special warranty”), or expressly disclaim any warranty of 
title.95  
D. Conclusion. 
In interpreting wellbore assignments, the title examiner should keep one 
overarching concern in mind: the assignment is more likely than not to be 
ambiguous. Any ambiguous assignment will likely require curative. 
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Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 13-25 (2002). 
 95. Kurt M. Petersen, Wellbores: Shedding Light on a Transactional Black Hole, 48 
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 13-31 (2002). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/4
2017]       Current & Emerging Issues in Oil & Gas Title Examination 521 
 
 
II. Commencement of Operations from Off-Unit Sites. 
Typically, a modern oil and gas lease has a commencement of operations 
clause. A common commencement clause in an oil and gas lease recites: 
If at the exploration of the primary term, Lessee is engaged in 
operations for the drilling, testing or reworking of any well on 
the lands covered by this lease or on lands spaced or unitized 
herewith, this lease nevertheless shall continue in force and 
effect so long as the operations for drilling or reworking of any 
well are being conducted thereon, and this lease shall remain in 
force so long as operations are prosecuted with no cessation of 
more than 60 consecutive days. 
This clause has consistently been held to allow a lessee to start surface 
operations, such as surveying, roadwork, drilling, and the placing of 
materials on location prior to the end of the primary term. These 
preliminary surface activities allow the lessee to extend the oil and gas lease 
past the primary term without the lease terminating. However, the 
remainder of the drilling operations must be diligently and timely 
prosecuted.  
A. General Issue. 
With the advent of horizontal drilling, Oklahoma oil and gas lessees have 
frequently sought to increase production (and lower costs) by drilling off-
unit to the north or south of a unit. Other times a lessee will commence a 
well in one section which extends horizontally into an adjacent section 
(multiunit well). This allows the lessee to utilize extremely long laterals.  
An issue may arise where an operator commences operations on lands 
located outside the drilling and spacing unit, and in the process of drilling 
does not pierce the drilling and spacing unit/section until after the primary 
term of a lease in the unit has expired. As an example, Operator prepares a 
surface location in the very southern part of Section 36 with the intent to 
drill vertically, and ultimately, horizontally into Sections 1 and 12. Further, 
there are circumstances where Sections 1 and 12 become a horizontal 
multiunit under an Oklahoma Corporation Commission Order and the well 
is commenced in Section 1, but does not pierce Section 12 until after the 
primary term of one or more or of the leases. If the lease allows the 
commencement of operations on a lease tract to extend the primary term, 
does this proposition still hold true when the surface operations are outside 
the lease or unit tract? The issue of whether these leases has expired is one 
that title examiners should be aware of.  
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B. Case Law.  
There is no Oklahoma law dealing with this issue, and due to the 
uniqueness of Oklahoma’s multiunit shale reservoir scheme, there are no 
cases from other jurisdictions which are on point. However, there are three 
cases that have dealt with the issue of the commencement of operations off-
unit in which the drilling well does not pierce or cross into the lease tract 
(or unit) until after the expiration of the primary term.  
The initial case that dealt with this fact situation is the Kansas case of 
A&M Oil, Inc. v. Miller.96 In A&M v. Miller, the lessee filed a declaratory 
judgment action asking the trial court to declare that he had properly 
commenced drilling operations extending three leases under the 
commencement of operations clause in each lease.97  
The facts are that prior to the end of the primary term of the leases, 
A&M received a license from the City of Stockton to directionally drill the 
well from an adjacent vacant lot.98 Two days prior to the end of the primary 
term, A&M also received a permit from the Kansas Corporation 
Commission authorizing the directional drilling.99 Four days prior to the 
termination of the two leases, the drilling site was prepared and the drilling 
rig was erected and an 88-foot hole was drilled.100 The case recites that 
drilling progressed and that on April 11, three days after the primary term, 
the drill bit penetrated the vertical plane of the drilling unit and resulted in a 
producing well.101 The lessors argued that the property line was not 
penetrated until after all three leases had expired.102  
The A&M lease recites: 
Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary, 
it is expressly agreed that if Lessee shall commence operations 
for drilling at any time while this lease is in force, this lease shall 
remain in force and its term shall continue so long as such 
operations are prosecuted and, if production results therefrom, 
then as long as production continues.103  
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The court said there was no dispute that the operations, in general, would 
have satisfied the commencement obligation.104 Further, the court held that 
there was no language in the commencement clause to require that the 
Lessee must commence operations on the surface of the unit.105  
The court stated that when construing oil and gas leases, they were 
guided by the intent of the parties.106 The court, without much explanation, 
noted that A&M’s preliminary actions to obtain authorization for slant 
drilling as well as the commencement of slant drilling occurred within the 
lease period.107 The court recited:  
We cannot agree with the landowners in their assertion that 
A&M must conduct some physical activity on the leased 
property in order to commence drilling operations. The leases 
are unambiguous and cannot be read to require physical entry. 
The trial court’s finding that the leases were extended under the 
drilling operations clause is correct.108  
The second case that dealt with this issue is the case of Manzano Oil 
Corporation v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc.109 Manzano, a top lessee, sued 
the base lessee, Chesapeake, asserting that the underlying three-year lease 
executed on August 3, 1995 lapsed.110 The facts show that the drilling well 
was spud on July 27, 1998 on a three-acre parcel adjoining the subject 
lease.111 The drill bit penetrated the subsurface of the leased tract on August 
12, 1998, nine days after the scheduled expiration of the primary term.112  
The court held that Chesapeake had essentially pooled the leased tract 
with the three-acre tract underlying the lease.113 The court held that the 
intent of the parties in the totality of the lease permitted the drilling of the 
horizontal well and allowed the extension of the lease under these 
circumstances.114 
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The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico rejected 
the argument that the drilling had to actually be on the leased tract.115 The 
court held that to hold that would be to negate the pooling provision of the 
lease.116  
As the Oklahoma Corporation Commission typically establishes drilling 
and spacing units, it is not likely that an Oklahoma court would agree that 
the three-acre tract was “pooled” with the other tract.  
The Manzano court also relied on Chesapeake’s commencement of 
operations. The court said that it was undisputed that Chesapeake timely 
began drilling operations on the property adjacent to the property covered 
by the lease.117 The court cited A&M Oil, Inc. v. Miller in holding that the 
intent of the parties, as manifested in the totality of the lease provisions and 
in the actions of the parties, permits the drilling of the horizontal well and 
allows for the extension of the lease under the circumstances presented.118  
There is one contrary case out of Pennsylvania. The case of Neuhard v. 
Range Resources – Appalachia, LLC.119 In Neuhard, the property owners 
brought an action against Range.120 Range created a 395-acre production 
unit comprised of nine separately owned parcels of land.121 Further, the 
facts show that Range obtained several mandatory permits from state and 
local regulatory agencies, including drilling, zoning and development 
permits.122 Range then commenced a well on acreage that it mistakenly 
believed was unitized with the leased premises prior to the expiration of the 
primary term.123 However, the drilling tract was not unitized due to limiting 
language in the lease involved.124  
The court held that commencement on the tract outside the lease was not 
adequate because the wording of the commencement clause stated that the 
Lessee shall commence a well on the “Leased Premises” or in a spacing 
unit containing a portion of the leased premises.125 The Pennsylvania Court 
interpreted the commencement clause literally.126 In this case, the court held 
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that since Range did not commence operations on the leased premises or on 
the surface of a spacing unit containing the leased premises, then the 
commencement was not sufficient to extend the lease as the lease was 
written.127  
C. Multiunit Wells. 
Another issue arises as to wells which are drilled in multiunits, or wells 
in which the OCC determines that two adjoining sections allow for a 
multiunit well, under the Oklahoma Shale Reservoir Development Act.  
For simplicity sake, let’s assume two separate scenarios: 
1. The lessee drills from a surface location in Section 36 and 
does not pierce the vertical plane of Section 1 and/or Section 12 
for a multiunit well until after the primary terms of one or more 
leases in Sections 1 and 12. 
2. The lessee drills a well from a surface location in Section 1 
and does not pierce Section 12 under a horizontal multiunit well 
until after the expiration of the primary term of one or more 
leases in Section 12. 
In our scenarios, we can also assume that an interim order for a multiunit 
well would have been obtained showing the location of the drilling pad and 
showing that the well would be drilled into Sections 1 and 12. 
The issue is whether the drilling bit actually needs to cross the section 
line before the lease expires in order to perpetuate the lease or will 
operations in the initial section perpetuate the lease. Although one cannot 
be certain based upon the lack of Oklahoma law, it would appear that 
Oklahoma courts could look to the language in the A&M and Manzano 
cases for guidance. If so, then the leases in Sections 1 and 12 would be 
extended.  
Although A&M and Manzano do not go into great detail as to why the 
courts ruled the way they did, an important factor in both cases is the fact 
that the lessees obtained the regulatory permits for the drilling of the well 
on the off-unit tract that would pierce the leased land. The primary holding 
of both these cases is that commencement need not be on the leased land.128 
Therefore, based upon the language in both cases, the answer would appear 
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to be that the operations in the heel section (Section 1) would presumably 
perpetuate the lease in the toe portion (or Section 12) even if the drilling bit 
did not cross over into Section 12 until after the primary term.  
One Oklahoma case where the court could look for precedence is the 
case of Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,129 Kuykendall held that 
where a lessee was effectively prevented from drilling a well on the lessor’s 
property, because of the pendency of a spacing application, that the lessee’s 
spacing application was, in essence, a commencement operation.130 The 
court allowed that the action of the spacing application extended the term of 
the primary term and that the “commencement” was the actual filing of the 
application with the Corporation Commission.131 Therefore, it would 
appear, although one cannot be certain, that an application for a multiunit 
well would be analogous to the Kuykendall case. However, the actual 
surface operations would also be necessary.  
As to the contrary view, the Neuhard case that did not allow the 
extension of the leases by virtue of the commencement of operations off-
unit held that the commencement of the well must strictly comply with the 
lease language.Further, it could be argued that the creation of multiunit 
wells under the Shale Reservoir Development Act is a method of allocation 
of the proceeds, but does not create a 1280-acre drilling and spacing unit. 
Therefore, the well was not drilled into a drilling and spacing unit. 
From a lessee’s standpoint, if the commencement clause in the lessee’s 
lease had the same language as that in the A&M case, then in the event of 
litigation, the lessee could assert that this is the identical language used in 
the A&M case which upheld the off-unit commencement. Further, it 
removes the issue of whether the lease commencement required operations 
on the leased land.  
III. Term Assignments. 
A "term assignment" is considered to be a type of a farmout agreement. 
Like any farmout agreement, a term assignment conditions the perpetuation 
of the assignee's interest on some objective, usually the establishment of oil 
or gas production or at least the commencement of operations within a 
specified period of time and continuous production or operations thereafter. 
The principal difference of a term assignment from a farmout agreement is 
that a term assignment is not an executory contract. The term assignment 
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conveys legal title to the interest the assignee may perpetuate or "earn" by 
conducting operations, usually in the form of a recorded conveyance. 
Term assignments, like oil and gas leases, are for a specified (primary) 
term of days, months, or years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is 
produced. If properly drafted from the assignee's perspective, they also 
include the same kind of savings provisions found in oil and gas leases, 
such as provisions for extension of the term by the assignee's drilling or 
other operations across the end of the fixed primary term before production 
has been established or by conducting additional drilling or reworking 
operations upon cessation of production. If a commencement of operations 
clause is not included in the term assignments, then this may be an issue if 
the assignee commences operations which continue over the end of the 
primary term and production is not secured prior to the expiration of the 
primary term. 
Except where a relatively small tract is involved, term assignments 
almost always provide, like oil and gas leases executed by sophisticated 
mineral owners, for partial termination at the expiration of the primary term 
or when continuous development has ceased thereafter, with the assignee 
retaining only developed land and, very often, only depths above those 
drilled or made productive. Term assignments do not usually contain a 
specific requirement for the nature and extent of the operations that the 
assignee must conduct in order to maintain or “earn” its interest as are 
common in farmout agreements, thus providing the assignee some 
flexibility over a traditional farmout agreement. A title examiner should be 
concerned with most of the same factors, and should consider examining 
the same kind of items in the context of farmout agreements.  
Because legal title is vested in the assignee under the term assignment, 
title should be reported in the assignee even before any operation that may 
“earn” the interest has been performed or commenced. This is different 
from the manner in which an examiner may report a farmed-out interest. 
Because the term assignment interest is not indefeasibly vested, however, 
and because this may not be as easily perceptible to the reader of a title 
opinion as the fact that applicable leases may be subject to expiration in the 
absence of operations or productions, it is good practice for the title opinion 
to show that the interest is subject to reversion on termination of the 
assignment.  
Once production has been established on land included in a term 
assignment, anyone thereafter examining title to the land must address the 
same kinds of concerns as are commonplace in considering whether oil and 
gas leases remain effective.  
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Title opinions on producing acreage subject to term assignments should 
advise the client to verify continuous production necessary to maintain the 
assignment in effect as to the assigned lease. Any other conditions to the 
assignment’s continued effectiveness should be noted as well, and a 
requirement should be made to verify that those have been met. Conversely, 
if a term assignment is considered to have expired in whole or in part, a 
release by the record assignee, or a verification of the circumstances leading 
to the assignment’s expiration, should be required.  
IV. Shut-In Clauses. 
In Oklahoma, it appears that operators (and title examiners) tend to be 
lackadaisical about whether shut in royalty payments are paid. One reason 
is the case of Gard v. Kaiser.132 In Gard, the court said that under 
Oklahoma law marketing is not required for production and lessees have a 
reasonable time after discovery to market. 
In Gard, the court determined that a relatively standard shut-in clause 
failed to create a special limitation.133    
This examiner is seeing more special provisions which state the 
following: 
This lease may not be maintained for a period of time longer 
than twenty-four (24) consecutive months beyond the primary 
term hereof solely by reason of a shut-in gas well or wells. 
In Blaser Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation,134 the lease 
provided for a deadline on paying shut-in royalties.135 However, the 
appellate court refused to terminate the lease even though the lessee was 
almost three months late in paying the shut-in royalty.136 The 10th Circuit, 
interpreting Oklahoma law, distinguished Gard and found that the parties 
were successful in creating a special limitation on the lease.137 However, 
based on the Oklahoma temporary cessation doctrine, the court concluded 
that Oklahoma law would relieve this lessee from application of the special 
limitation became of equitable considerations.138 
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Therefore, an issue may arise where a shut-in period extends beyond two 
years. At that point, a court will need to determine whether the shut-in 
limitation period is a special limitation or whether this was a contractual 
covenant.  
If this situation arises in Oklahoma, then an Oklahoma state  
appellate court will need to determine whether the 24-month period is i) a 
special limitation, and, if so, ii) whether equitable considerations exist to 
allow the lease to not be terminated.  
Title examiners are not in a position to determine whether a clause is or 
is not a special limitation, and, certainly, whether equitable considerations 
exist to allow the continuation of the lease. Therefore, an examiner in the 
preparation of a Division Order Title Opinion needs to note the clause, the 
shut-in period, and ask for a ratification of the underlying lease. 
V. Affidavits of Pooling.  
On July 1, 1993, Oklahoma Statute 52 § 87.4 was enacted. The statute 
recites the following:  
An affidavit evidencing any election for the drilling of a well 
under a pooling order issued pursuant to the proceedings set out 
in subsection (e) of Section 87.1 of Title 52 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes shall constitute constructive notice of the rights under 
the election claimed by the affiant when the affidavit is filed of 
record in the office of the county clerk for the county in which 
the lands described in the pooling order are located. The affidavit 
shall set out the name, addresses, if known, the election or 
deemed election for each pooled respondent included in the 
affidavit and shall have a copy of the pooling order attached. The 
affidavit may be filed by the operator designated in the pooling 
order of by any other interested party with knowledge of any 
election made. Filing of the affidavit shall not affect notice 
provided by virtue of pooling proceedings conducted by the 
Commission.139  
Despite the fact that the statute recites that the affidavit constitutes 
constructive notice of the election under the pooling, many operators fail or 
decline to file the statutory pooling affidavit.    
The impact of an applicant’s failure to file an affidavit of pooling has not 
resulted in any reported decisions on the lack of constructive notice to a 
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subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or creditor.  One assertion is that the 
OCC proceedings are public record and, therefore, are notice to all parties. 
In a bankruptcy case decided by the Northern District of Texas, the 
plaintiffs asserted the filing of the affidavit under § 87.4 was required to 
establish constructive notice of a bank’s liens on pooled acreage.140 As the 
court had already determined that a recording of a blanket mortgage, which 
did not describe certain properties, did not constitute constructive notice, 
the court declined to address the assertion.141 
The statute is deficient as to the timing when the OCC applicant should 
record the affidavit of pooling. A typical Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission Pooling Order allows respondents twenty days after the entry 
of the Order in which to make an election. If no election is made within the 
twenty-day period, then a respondent is deemed to have an election made 
for him under the terms of the order. An unanswered question is who 
prevails when an intervening claimant records his conveyance or claim on 
the 21st day following the entry of a Corporation Commission Order. It 
doesn’t seem equitable that an intervening claimant could claim priority 
over a pooling applicant or other party affected by the pooling order.  
VI. Affidavits of Death and Heirship.  
In 1999, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted 16 O.S § 67. Under 16 O.S. § 
67, the statute recites that an owner of a severed mineral interest in real 
estate may be able to claim marketable title pursuant to an Affidavit of 
Death and Heirship recorded pursuant to 16 O.S. § 82 and 83. However, in 
order to be able to claim such an interest, it must satisfy 16 O.S. § 67(c). 
Section 67(c) recites: 
In order to establish marketable title pursuant to this section: 
1.  The affidavit or recital must state that the decedent died 
without a will, or if the decedent had a will, that the will was 
never probated in Oklahoma and a copy of the will is attached to 
the affidavit or recital, or if the will was probated that the 
severed mineral interest was omitted from the final decree of the 
decedent and a copy of the will and final decree is attached to the 
affidavit or recital; 
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 141. Id. at 410. 
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2.  The affidavit or recital must list the names of the decedent’s 
heirs and their relationship to the decedent; 
3.  The affidavit or recital must state that the maker is related to 
the decedent or otherwise has personal knowledge of the facts 
stated therein; 
4.  The affidavit or the title transaction that contains the recital 
must have been recorded for at least ten (10) years in the office 
of the county clerk in the county in which the real property is 
located; and 
5.  During the ten-year period following the recording of the 
affidavit or the title transaction that contains the recital, no 
instrument inconsistent with the heirship alleged in the affidavit 
or recital was filed in the office of the county clerk in the county 
in which the real property is located.142 
However, Oklahoma Bar Association Title Examination Standard 3.2.D 
recites that certain other requirements are necessary. Title Standard 3.2.D.2 
recommends that the affidavit contain sufficient factual information to 
make a proper determination of heirship.143 Such information includes the 
death of the decedent, a copy of a death certificate, marital history of the 
decedent, names and dates of the death of all spouses, a listing of all 
children of the decedent including any adopted children, identity of the 
other parent of all children of the decedent, the date of death of any 
deceased children, and the identity of the deceased child’s spouse and issue, 
if any.144  
The Title Standard also recites that the statute is unclear as to the 
situation where unprobated Wills are attached to the affidavit and whether 
title is to pass to the intestate heirs or to the devisees under the Will. The 
Title Standard further recites that until such time as the Will is admitted to 
probate, it is ineffectual to pass title to real property. This statute, combined 
with the Title Standard is troublesome to title examiners. There is no 
guidance on what factors can be used and whether, for example, an 
unprobated Will can deny inheritance to an heir who was without notice (or 
due process) as to the recording of the Will. Further, it is the author’s 
opinion, that based upon the statute and the Title Standard, it is a very rare 
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circumstance that any recorded Affidavit of Death and Heirship can 
actually satisfy all of the requirements. 
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